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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arvilla wishes to correct an error made in her Statement of 
Facts, page 10, and in Point II of her Brief, page 26. Arvilla was 
incorrect in asserting that Roger was his mother's sole surviving 
child. Rather, Mrs. Mina Finlayson, testified she had three 
children, two of whom were still alive, Roger and Marilyn. (R-556) 
At the time Arvilla's Brief was written, her appellate counsel 
thought she had only had two children, Roger and Roland. 
Roger's Statement of Facts attempts to establish that Arvilla 
had substantial knowledge about the 2 "notes" however the testimony 
of Roger and his mother show that not to be the case. Mrs. 
Finlayson said that the Hallmark "loan" was not any of Arvilla's 
affair (R-541) and that the loan was between her son and her only. 
(R-558) Roger said Arvilla really never knew what was owed to his 
mother and that it was none of her business. (R-698) Arvilla had 
no knowledge of the rent "note" and in fact thought any sums 
advanced to be a gift (R-493) consistent with the monies given 
Roger's brother Roland. (R-521-22) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE WAY IT 
DEALT WITH THE "RENT NOTE" AND INCORRECT IN 
THE WAY IT DEALT WITH THE "HALLMARK NOTE" 
Both Roger and Arvilla agree that the trial court erred in the 
inconsistent way it dealt with the two "notes" in question. 
The thrust of Roger's argument is that the trial court had the 
equitable power to include both notes as marital obligations and in 
failing to include the rent "note/1 it abused its discretion. 
Arvilla, on the other hand, argues that the trial court did not 
have the power to include either "note" and in so including the 
Hallmark "note" it not only abused its discretion but also 
committed errors in law. 
Three separate and distinct errors were committed by the trial 
court in its handling the "Hallmark Note." First, it determined 
that the debt was marital even though it was incurred by Roger, 2 
years before the marriage, without any involvement of Arvilla. In 
addition, everyone admitted that Arvilla knew little if anything 
about the alleged loan. Roger and his mother said it was none of 
her affair. (R-541, 558, 698) The note which "surfaced" after 18 
years was totally silent about the amounts allegedly advanced. 
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Conveniently, at the time of trial, what Roger said was an initial 
$14,800.00 loan had grown to $40,553.74. In spite of these 
undisputed facts, the trial court found this to be a marital debt 
on which both parties were obligated. This was highly inequitable 
to Arvilla and an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Second, the trial court then imposed liability for one half of 
that debt on Arvilla without allowing her the right to defend on 
the merits of the claim. In effect, a separate civil action was 
allowed to be litigated and resolved in the divorce action to which 
Roger's mother was not even a party. To allow the divorce action 
to be a vehicle for Roger's mother to secure a judgment against 
Arvilla was clearly an error in law. 
Third, assuming for the sake of argument only, that this debt 
was a valid debt, the trial court not only affirmed the debt but 
ruled that the parties' marital residence and cash was security for 
the debt and required that the debt be paid from those sources. It 
did this even though no security agreement ever existed. This 
amounted to converting an unsecured debt into a secured debt which 
would be paid without Roger's mother ever having to file a lawsuit. 
Simply put, the trial court collected a debt for Roger's mother 
using marital assets, without giving Arvilla an opportunity to 
defend on the merits. 
For Roger to argue that this transaction should not be subject 
to the same scrutiny as a commercial transaction because it is a 
"family" transaction is simply specious. If Arvilla is to be 
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charged with responsibility for one-half of a $40,000.00 
obligation, she is entitled to all protections afforded any debtor 
from whom a creditor seeks recovery. 
The flaw in Roger's argument that equity allows a divorce 
court to do this is that equitable considerations are applicable 
only as to the husband and wife involved in the action. Principles 
of equity in divorce cases do not extend to third party creditors 
such as Roger's mother was made out to be. 
The trial court was correct in concluding that the rent note 
should not be considered a marital obligation. It was incorrect in 
concluding the "Hallmark note" was a marital obligation. In the 
case of either, Roger's mother can seek to recover what she thinks 
is due her by filing her own independent action and Roger and 
Arvilla can respond and raise such defenses as he or she may see 
fit. 
In summary, a divorce court is not a proper forum to allow a 
third person, not a party to the action, to secure a judgment and 
collect amounts the third person feels the divorce litigants may 
owe him or her. 
On page 23 of Roger's Brief, he states: 
In short, there appears no substantial reason 
to treat the "Hallmark Note" and "Rent Note" 
in a different manner as equity requires 
consistency of treatment. Id. 
Arvilla agrees totally with this statement and asks this Court to 
reverse the trial court's decision related to the Hallmark "Note." 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS RELATED TO THE VACANT 
LOT IN SPITE OF ROGER'S ARGUMENTS TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
Contrary to Roger's argument in Point II of his Brief, Arvilla 
did set forth in her brief all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's finding that the vacant lot adjacent to the marital 
residence was not marital property. The sum and substance of that 
evidence amounted to the testimony of three most interested and 
very aligned individuals; Roger, Roger's mother and Roger's son. 
Each testified that the lot was never intended to be given to Roger 
and Arvilla. Conspicuously absent from Roger's evidence on this 
issue is any documentary evidence or non-interested third party 
testimony in support of Roger's position that the lot was not 
marital property. 
In accord with her responsibility on appeal, Arvilla did 
marshall all of the evidence in support of that finding. (See page 
24, Arvilla's Brief) She then proceeded to set forth all of the 
evidence which was against such a finding and in favor of a finding 
that the lot was marital property. That evidence consisted of 
Arvilla's testimony, documentary evidence and undisputed facts 
related to the parties' control and maintenance of this property 
for over 13 years. (See pp 24-26 of Arvilla's principal Brief.) 
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When viewed and taken as a whole, the evidence clearly weighs 
in favor of a finding that the lot was marital property and should 
have not been excluded from the marital estate• 
Parenthetically, the practical effect of the trial court's 
decision was to expand a regular divorce proceeding, involving only 
Roger and Arvilla, into a quiet title action involving Arvilla and 
Roger and Roger's mother. In so doing, it granted Roger's mother, 
a non-party to this action, relief which she could not have secured 
without being required to file her own action. In addition, the 
action of the trial court effectively precluded Arvilla from 
raising numerous defenses such as adverse possession, statute of 
limitations, estoppel, laches and waiver. 
As with the Hallmark note issue, the trial court improperly 
merged separate independent actions into the divorce and granted 
Roger's mother, a non party, relief that could properly only be 
secured by her filing her own civil action against Roger and 
Arvilla to set aside the deed and quiet title in her name. 
The evidence, when viewed objectively, is overwhelmingly in 
favor of a finding that the lot was marital property, having been 
properly conveyed to Roger and Arvilla 13 years before the trial of 
this divorce case. The lot should have been included as part of 
the marital estate. 
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POINT III 
ARVILLA IS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED ALL OF 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES SHE WAS REQUIRED TO INCUR 
BECAUSE OF ROGER'S RECALCITRANT BEHAVIOR. 
Point III of Roger's Brief fails to address the basic question 
raised by Arvilla - Was she entitled to be awarded $2,599.15 in 
fees attributable to Roger's failure to cooperate during the 
divorce proceedings when there was no evidence offered to 
contradict the fact that those fees had been incurred and when 
Roger's recalcitrance had been noted by the trial court? 
Roger does not deny his actions/inactions related to this 
recalcitrance as described on page 28 of Arvillafs Brief. In fact, 
he admits his failure to cooperate. (See page 16 of Roger's 
Brief.) The trial court acknowledged that the evidence was strong 
that he frequently did not carry out intentions. (R-293) 
The trial court recognized the uncooperative attitude of 
Roger. The only evidence before the court as to the amount of fees 
Arvilla was required to incur as a result of that uncooperative 
attitude, was the unchallenged testimony of Ms. Donovan. Given 
this, the trial court was left with no other alternative than to 
award Arvilla the entire $2,599.15 in requested fees. 
To arbitrarily give her only $500.00 of that sum in the face 
of that uncontradicted evidence is reversible error. Arvilla 
should receive an additional $2,099.15 in fees to reimburse her for 
the fees she would not have had to incur had Roger not acted in 
such a contrary way throughout these proceedings. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AND COMMITTED ERRORS IN LAW 
IN THE WAY IT CONDUCTED THE TRIAL AND REACHED 
IT'S DECISION. 
Point IV of Roger's Brief misses the point and thrust of 
Arvilla's claim that the trial judge acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in its overall handling of the trial and 
rendering of its decision. 
First, Arvilla wishes to reemphasize that she would request a 
new trial on all issues, only if this Court does not reverse the 
trial court's decision related to the "Hallmark note," the adjacent 
lot and the $500.00 award of attorney's fees. If this Court grants 
the relief requested in Points I, II and III, of her principal 
brief, that relief would be sufficient to allow her to withdraw her 
request for a new trial before a different Judge. 
In order for Arvilla to prevail in an appeal, she must show 
that the trial court, in making it's distribution of property, 
1) Misunderstood or misapplied the law; 
2) Entered findings not supported by the evidence; 
3) Caused a serious inequity; or 
4) Acted arbitrarily and capriciously, so as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion. [See English v. English 565 P.2d, 409, 410 
(Utah 1977).] 
As demonstrated in Arvilla's principal brief and not 
adequately rebutted by Roger, the trial court, 
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1) Acted inconsistently in the way it handled the two 
"notes" and gave relief where it was not justified and imposed 
burdens on Arvilla which were not legally enforceable. 
2) Entered findings related to the undeveloped lot which 
were clearly contrary to weight of the objective evidence 
presented. 
3) Enforced an unenforceable obligation and excluded a 
significant asset from the marital estate, causing a serious 
inequity to Arvilla and in effect giving Roger the "lions share" of 
the marital estate. 
4) Blatantly acted arbitrarily and capricious in the 
assigning of values to and distribution of the personal property of 
the parties improperly forcing the parties to settle that issue 
rather than entrusting their fate to the "flip of a coin." 
The record, the statements of the trial judge from the bench 
and the statements in his Memorandum Decision demonstrate that he 
was inattentive and did not understand or properly apply the law to 
the facts presented to him. The arguments made in the Point IV of 
Arvilla1 s principal brief are well taken and have not been 
successfully rebutted by Roger by claiming that such a division was 




THIS COURT MAY DISREGARD ANY OR ALL OF ROGER'S 
TESTIMONY BECAUSE HE TESTIFIED FALSELY ABOUT 
HIS EXHIBIT 18 
In the course of briefing, Appellant's counsel has discovered 
a fact that calls into question the authenticity and validity of 
Roger's Exhibit 18, the Hallmark "note", (Page A-l Addendum to 
this reply Brief) and the truthfulness of Roger's testimony about 
that Exhibit, 
During trial, Roger produced two "notes" he claimed he 
prepared and signed and gave to his father on September 4, 1962, 
and September 4, 1964, respectively. (See Defendant's Exhibit's 18 
and 19 included in the Addendum to Arvilla's principal Brief and 
the Addendum to this Reply Brief.) He testified he prepared and 
signed Exhibit 18 on September 4, 1962. (R-581, 582) He then 
testified he did not see either of these notes until shortly before 
the divorce was filed in December of 1990. (R-582) His mother's 
testimony was different. She said she found these papers about 18 
years ago, 2 or 3 years after her husband's death, (R-561) and 
that she had given them to Roger several years ago. (R-561-562) 
Arvilla, during the course of trial questioned the 
authenticity of the two "notes" but was not successful in 
convincing the trial court that these notes were prepared in 
anticipation of this litigation. (R-603) It has now become apparent 
to Arvilla's counsel that Defendant's Exhibit 18 is not authentic 
and had to have been prepared later in time and after the fact, 
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contrary to Roger's testimony. This is the only conclusion that 
can be reached because Exhibit 18, allegedly prepared by Roger on 
September 4, 1962, contains two addresses. Both addresses have Zip 
Codes of "84105." 
This Court should take judicial notice of the fact that Zip 
Codes were not adopted and implemented by the Postal Service until 
July 1, 1963. (See page i of U.S. Postal Service 1992 Book of Zip 
Codes, included in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.) 
The document itself reveals that Roger did not testify 
truthfully and as such this Court can disregard any or all of his 
testimony in resolving the issues raised in this appeal. [(See 
Gittens v. Lundbercr. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284, P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955).] 
Arvilla would respectfully request this Court to deny and 
dismiss Roger's cross appeal and grant Arvilla all of the relief 
she has requested. 
POINT VI 
ARVILLA IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS RELATED TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
In arguing that neither party should be awarded their 
attorney's fees and costs related to this appeal, Roger fails to 
demonstrate an understanding of the legal principles enunciated by 
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court in relation to awarding fees 
and costs in connection with the appeal of divorce cases. 
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First, Arvilla agrees that Roger is not entitled to an award 
of any fees ctnd costs on appeal because he has net requested them 
and in fact has argued that each side should bear their own fees. 
Second, it is a well established principle of Utah law that 
when a party to a divorce action is required to appeal a trial 
court's decision and successfully demonstrates that the trial court 
committed substantial and prejudicial error requiring reversal, 
that party is entitled to be reimbursed by the other party the fees 
incurred on the appeal, [See Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489, 494 (Utah 
App. 1991); Grouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991).] 
In this case, Arvilla has demonstrated that the trial court 
committed errors in law, made an unfair and inequitable 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities and acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner justifying a reversal of the trial 
court's decision. Having done so, she is entitled to be awarded 
her fees and costs related to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The responsibility of a trial court in divorce cases is to 
fashion a property and debt distribution which is fair to both 
parties. In this case, the trial court's decision cannot stand in 
that it is blatantly unfair to Arvilla, and not in accord with 
existing Utah law as it relates to equitable distribution of debt 
and property. Arvilla respectfully requests this Court to award 
her the relief requested on page 3 of her principal Brief; to deny 
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the relief requested by Roger in his cross appeal and to award her 
all of her fees and costs related to this appeal• 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \C\ day of March, 1993. 
DART. ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
By_ / V,<., .I.L>-_.L^ - A-' V-
Kent M. Kasting of Counsel 
Sharon A. Donovan 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Postal Service publishes the National Five-Digit ZIP Code and Post Office Directory annually to famish customers 
and U.S. Postal Service personnel correct and current five-digit ZIP Code and mailing information. 
This directory contains complete information relating to the five-digit ZIP Code system and Information required by the 
mailer concerning U.S. Postal Service facilities and organization, 
The five-digit ZIP (Zone Improvement Plan) Code was introduced to the public July 1 • t963 and was viewed as a positive step 
for improving the productivity of mail distribution during a period of escalating mail volume and expanding delivery stops. 
Additionally, five-digit ZIP Code areas lend themselves to a broad variety of other applications, including geographic and 
demographic utilization, 
Currently, 98% of all First-Class Mail bears a ZIP Code. ZIP Codes support the distribution of letters and other types of mail to 
40,000 post offices, stations, and branches serving approximately 117 million homes, farms, and businesses across the nation. 
It is extremely important that all mailers obtain a current edition of this publication in order to have the accurate five-digit ZIP 
Code information for any address in the nation. 
Five-digit ZIP Code information may also be obtained by calling the main post office in your local area. 
HOW TO FIND A FIVE-DIGIT ZIP CODE® IN THIS DIRECTORY 
The following instructions and sample page layout (p. 3-2) will help you find the correct five-digit ZIP Code for mailing 
addresses. 
FOR MOST POST OFFICES 
1. TURNto Section 3, STATE LIST OF POST OFFICES AND POST OFFICES WITH STREET LISTINGS, and find the state 
in alphabetical order. 
2. FIND the post office in alphabetical order within the state. 
3. If a post office has more than one five-digit ZIP Code, you will find A "SEE PAGE11 reference followed by a page number. 
These post offices' listings are in the following order 
A. Post office boxes at main offices, stations, and branches 
B. Rural routes and/or highway contracts 
C Postmaster and general delivery 
D. Apartments, hotels, buildings, governmental offices, etc, 
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